I
Almost everyone acknowledges the ambiguity of 'ought', even when it is restricted to moral contexts.^ One distinction is that between using 'ought' to express an ideal (as in 'No child ought to have to suffer') and using it to express an obligation (as in Tou ought to keep your promise'). Within the province of moral obligation, there is the distinction between what W. D. Ross calls prima facie obligation and what many call allthings-considered obligation but wbich I, for brevity, will call overall obligation. Witbin tbe province of overall obligation, many philosophers allege tbat tbere is yet a furtber ambiguity between wbat are often called objective obligation and subjective obligation. This allegation is the subject of tbis article.
It is witb overall moral obligation that tbe morally conscientious person is primarily concerned. Wben one wonders what to do in a particular situation and asks, out of conscientiousness, 'Wbat ought I to do?', tbe 'ougbt' expresses overall moral obligation. 'Ougbt' bere is a contrary of 'wrong'. Conscientiousness precludes deliberately doing what one believes to be overall morally wrong. Â s I understand tbe debate between consequentialists and non-consequentialists, tbeir disagreement concerns what it is tbat overall moral obligation consists in. I will not engage in tbis debate bere. For 330 Michael J. Zimmerman tbe sake of convenience, I will adopt an approacb tbat is tjT)ical of one kind of consequentialism. (I believe tbat my findings could be adapted to otber kinds of consequentialism and to non-consequentialism, too, but I will not pursue tbis point.) On this approacb, wbat we ought to do (in tbe sense tbat expresses overall moral obligation) is a function of tbe value of wbat we do, wbich is itself a function of some non-evaluative 'stuff. (My use ofthe term 'stuff is intended to be metaphysically neutral.) For example, utilitarians (as portrayed by G. E. Moore^) believe that what we ought to do is perform that act with the highest instrumental value, which itself consists in bringing about the most favourable balance of pleasure over pain. Most consequentialists follow utilitarianism in saying that overall moral obligation involves maximizing the relevant value; others take a more relaxed stand."* Again, for the sake of convenience, I will adopt a maximizing approach. (I believe that my findings could be adapted to non-maximizing approaches, too, but I will not pursue this point either.)
We are now in a position to distinguish three broad views concerning what we ought, in the sense of overall moral obligation, to do. Using the term 'actual value' to refer to the value (whatever that may be) that resides in the stuff of moral obligation (whatever that may be), we may put these views as follows:
1. An agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would (uniquely) maximize actual value (among the range of options that the agent has);2 . an agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would maximize expected value; 3. an agent ought to perform an act if and only if he (or she) believes that doing so would maximize actual value.
It is usually something like View 1 that is said to express the idea that obligation is 'objective', but not always; Bertrand Russell, for example, says this of something like View 2.^ There is no such consensus concerning the idea that obligation is 'subjective'. Many pbilosophers say that something like View 2 captures this idea;^ many others saŷ G. E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford, 1912) , chs. 1 and 2. • * For example, Michael Slote, 'Satisficing Consequentialism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58 (1984) .
The two phrases in parentheses are to be understood to be implicitly at work not only in the statement of this view (View 1) but also in the statement of all such views to follow (View 2, View 3, etc.).
Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (London, 1910) , pp. 30-1. ' For example: Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht, 1986) 
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331 that something like View 3 does so;^ a few say this of both View 2 and View 3.9
There is disagreement among philosophers whether each of Views 1-3 captures a legitimate sense of 'ought'. There is reason to think that it does. If'ought' is ambiguous in other ways, why not in this way too? Indeed, acknowledging such ambiguity may seem helpful. Consider the plight of the conscientious person who has searched in vain for an answer to the question 'What ought I to do?' and yet finds himself forced to make a decision. In such a case he might say: 'Well, I have not been able to figure out what I ought to do. Now what ought I to do?'^" If we do not distinguish between senses of 'ought', this is a puzzling question. The only answer can be, 'You ought to do whatever it is that you ought to do, whether you know what that is or not'. This is a singularly unhelpful response. Ifwe do distinguish between senses of 'ought', though, another answer might be given: 'When you do not know what you ought (objectively) to do, you ought (subjectively) to do such-and-such'. Depending on the specification of 'such-and-such' (perhaps in terms of View 2 or View 3), this looks like it could be helpful.
Someone who answers the conscientious person's inquiry in the manner just noted would say, in response to the question posed in the title of this article, that overall moral obligation is both objective and subjective -or, more carefully, that there are both objective and subjective kinds of overall moral obligation. Despite the appeal of such a position, there is nonetheless reason to think that it is mistaken -to think, that is, that there is just one kind of overall moral obligation (whether objective, or subjective, or neither). Notice, first, that regardless of just how the 'such-and-such' is specified, there is the threat of a regress. The answer just given to the conscientious person has this form: 'When you do not know what you oughti to do, you ought2 to do such-and-such'. But that suggests another question, 'What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought2 to do?', which in turn suggests another answer: 'When you do not know what you ought2 to do, you ought3 to do so-and-so'. But that suggests yet another question, with yet another answer, and so on and on. Even ifwe can find a way to halt the regress, the prospect is disturbing. Should we really he prepared to countenance such a proliferation of 'oughts'? Second, there is the nagging feeling that, far from being helpful, such a proliferation of 'oughts' would succeed only in further confounding decision-making. Consider what Ross says at one point when discussing the matter of overall moral obligation:
[W]hen people express different opinions about the rightness or wrongness of an act, the difference is often due to the fact that one of them is thinking of objective and the other of subjective rightness. The recognition ofthe difference between the two is therefore in itself important as tending to reconcile what might otherwise seem irreconcilable differences of opinion.
Yet he immediately goes on to say: 'But the question remains, which of the characteristics -objective or subjective rightness -is ethically the more important, which ofthe two acts is that which we ought to do'.^Â t first, this may seem an odd question. If Ross is prepared to recognize objective and subjective senses of 'right', why not also of 'ought'? But in fact there is clearly something to his question. We may pose it in the following more general form: once the various 'oughts' ('oughti', 'ought2', and so on) have been distinguished, which is the one that really counts? You may resist the question. 'They all count', you may say. But they cannot all count equally, for then the agent would suffer an embarrassment of riches. Suppose that, because of the quandary you are in, various 'oughts' are said to apply: you oughti to do A (even if you do not know this), ought2 to do B (even if you do not know this), ought3 to do C, and so on. If all these 'oughts' counted equally then, given that you could not do all of A, B, C, and so on, you would be in a moral dilemma. But, regardless of whether moral dilemmas should be said to be possible,^^ surely the mere fact that you are in a quandary should not be thought sufficient to put you in a dilemma. ^" Ross, Foundations, p. 147 There is therefore strong pressure to say that only one ofthe 'oughts' that apply really counts (or at least that, if any ofthe others count at all, they do not count as much). But then that raises the question: which of these 'oughts' is the one that really counts? (Alternatively, which 'ought' ought you to act on?) One answer is: that 'ought' about which you are not ignorant. We are thus faced with a puzzle. The question 'What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?' is perfectly cogent; its cogency suggests a multiplicity of 'oughts'; this multiplicity is unacceptable, however, unless the various 'oughts' are prioritized; yet such prioritization renders all subordinate 'oughts' redundant. How is this puzzle to be resolved?
What follows is an attempt to answer this question and the more general question posed in the title of this article. The plan ofthe article is this: Section II -a discussion and rejection of View 3; Section III -a discussion and rejection of View 1; Section IV-an elaboration of View 2; Section V -a limited defense of View 2 and a resolution of the puzzle just raised; Section VI -a discussion of the question whether overall moral obligation is objective or subjective.
II
In order to check the credentials of Views 1-3, I will examine a series of cases, each a version of one originally devised by Frank Jackson.^* Each version involves a physician, Jill, whose patient, John, suffers from a minor but not trivial skin complaint. Jill has three drugs to choose from: A, B, and C. It is in fact the case that drug A will relieve but not completely cure John's condition, that drug B will completely cure it, and that drug C will kill him. Now consider this version:
Version 1: Jill knows that giving John drug A will cure him partially, giving him drug B will cure him completely, giving him drug C will kill him, and giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable.
Here, I think, there would be little hesitation on anyone's part concerning what Jill ought to do. All else being equal, Jill ought to give John drug B. Given her knowledge about the efficacy ofthe alternative treatments, there is no need to consider any other 'oughts' but this. (Having said this, there is in fact reason to doubt this seemingly obvious verdict. Promissory Note no. 1:1 will return to this point in Section V.)
Problems arise, though, when truth, evidence, and belief do not combine to provide Jill with such knowledge. Consider the following:
Version 2:
All the evidence at Jill's disposal indicates what in fact is the case, namely, that giving John drug A will cure him partially, giving him drug B will cure him completely, giving him drug C will kill him, and giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable. In keeping with the evidence, Jill believes that giving John drug A will cure him partially and that giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable. However, despite the evidence, she believes that giving him drug C will cure him completely and giving him drug B will kill him.
Suppose that, acting on the basis of her beliefs, Jill gives John drug C and thereby kills him. Clearly his death is very unfortunate, but should we say that Jill did not do what she ought to have done (when 'ought' expresses overall moral obligation)? Should we say, that is, that she did overall moral wrong in giving John drug C? Or should we say, as View 3 dictates, that she acted as she ought to have done?
Some would deny that Jill acted as she ought to have done, on the grounds that, in failing to heed the available evidence, she was negligent and, in acting negligently, she did wrong. But this is doubly mistaken. First, the failure to heed available evidence need not constitute negligence. (Promissory Note no. 2: I will provide a brief explanation of this in Section IV.) Second, negligent behavior need of a case of this kind was in Donald Regan, Utilitarianism, and Co-operation (Oxford, 1980), pp. 264-5. First, if Jill was not negligent, then she is certainly not to blame for acting as she did; but that leaves unaffected the fact that what she did was wrong. We must take care to distinguish the blameworthiness of agents from the wrongness of actions; otherwise, excuses (of the sort that consist in being blameless despite having done wrong) would be a conceptual impossibility -which I take it they are not.^Ŝ econd, View 3 implies that all agents possess a certain sort of potential moral infallibility. If (as seems plausible) we always know, whenever we have a belief about what it would be best to do, what it is that we believe, then, if View 3 were true and we knew this, we would always know what we ought to do. But this makes a mockery of the conscientious person's inquiry into what he ought to do, implying that such an inquiry can be successfully carried out simply via introspection.
Third, View 3 implies that, on the assumption that he was doing what he believed to be best. Hitler did no wrong. But it is grotesque to think that such a belief could suffice to render such evil-doing permissible.
The three points just made are familiar, having been made in one way or another by a great many writers. They suffice, I believe, to show that View 3 is false; that is, they show that it is not the case that an agent ought to perform an act if and only if he believes that doing so would maximize actual value, when (a) 'ought' is taken to express overall moral obligation and (b) doing what is overall morally obligatory is taken to be the primary concern ofthe morally conscientious person. I stress both (a) and (b), because they are crucial to the rejection of View 3. I have no wish to deny that, if either (a) or (b) fails to apply, then View 3, or something like it, is acceptable.
Consider what A. C. Ewing says: 'We may believe... that the soldiers who fight against us in a war are acting wrongly in fighting, yet every reasonable person will admit that, as long as they really think they ought to fight, they ought "to obey their consciences" and fight'. ^^ There is clearly a tension in what Ewing says, something that he himself is quick to recognize. How can it be that our enemies are acting wrongly if, in doing so, they are obeying their consciences and they ought to obey their consciences? Ewing's answer is that 'ought' is ambiguous, so '^ See Michael J. Zimmerman, 'Another Plea for Excuses ', American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2004) . '" Ewing, Definition, that the sense in which our enemies 'ought' to obey their consciences is different from the sense in which they 'ought not' to fight us. I do not deny Ewing's thesis. I have denied that View 3 is true, insofar as both (a) and (b) apply, but it is consistent with this to claim that one ought, in some sense of 'ought' not governed by both (a) and (b) , to do what one believes would maximize actual value. Ewing's remark may seem to suggest that he accepts this claim. In fact, he does not, and for good reason. What he does accept is the related but importantly different claim that one ought (in some sense not governed by both (a) and (b)) to do what one believes one ought (in the sense governed by both (a) and (b)) to do; or equivalently, that it is wrong (in the former sense) to do what one believes is wrong (in the latter sense). ^^ I would in fact advise against putting matters in this way; such a double use of 'ought' (or 'wrong') courts confusion. Much better is to say that one is blameworthy if and only if one does what one believes is wrong (in the sense governed by both (a) and (b) -in the sense, that is, in which the primary concern of the conscientious person is to discover and avoid doing what is wrong). ^^ This acknowledges and preserves the distinction, noted earlier, between the blameworthiness of agents and the wrongness of actions. (Redemption of Promissory Note no. 3: just as agents can do wrong but not be blameworthy, so too they can be blameworthy and not do wrong. Negligence -understood in one way, at least -consists in neglecting what one believes to be one's obligation, and thus^® confers culpability; but the belief may be mistaken, in which case no wrong is " Note that, just as 'ought' and 'wrong' can be used to do double duty in this way, so too can 'expect'. In one sense, all that can be expected of someone is that he do what he is obligated to do. In another sense, all that can be expected is that he do what he believes he is obligated to do.
There is a complication: Ewing (Definition, pp. 132-3) reserves the term 'moral obligation' for a sense of'ought' not governed by (b) . There is a sense of ought' according to which the primary concern of the conscientious person is to discover and do what he ought to do. I have used the term 'overall moral obligation' for this sense of'ought'. Ewing, however, says that one's 'moral obligation' is not to do what one ought, in this sense, to do, but rather to do what one believes one ought, in this sense, to do. This seems to me to constitute a serious misapplication of the term 'moral obligation', but the dispute is merely verbal.
'^ Actually, this is only roughly correct. The conditions of blameworthiness -at least when 'blameworthy' expresses moral culpability, the 'negative' side of moral responsibility -are more complex. In particular, a freedom condition must be satisfied. In addition, one can be blameworthy, even if one acts conscientiously, if one is to be blamed for one's conscience. (Compare Brandt, Ethical Theory, p. 363 what he morally ought to do) presently dictates is accurate. Thus he will not rest content with letting his conscience be his guide; for acting conscientiously does not guarantee that one will avoid doing wrong. This is something that the conscientious person recognizes; it is precisely his fallibility with respect to what his overall moral obligation is that drives his conscientious inquiries. However, when it comes to judging, not people's actions (in terms of moral obligation), but people (in terms of praiseand blameworthiness) in light of their actions, then we should look to whether they have acted as their consciences dictate. As long as the two types of judgment are kept distinct, there should be no suspicion of inconsistency.
Ill
The rejection of View 3 still leaves open the question whether overall moral obligation is properly accounted for by either or both of Views 1 and 2.
To answer this question, consider the following:
All the evidence at Jill's disposal indicates (in keeping with the facts) that giving John drug A will cure him partially and giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable, but it also indicates (in contrast to the facts) that giving him drug C will cure him completely and giving him drug B will kill him.
Suppose that, acting on the basis of the evidence, Jill gives John drug C and thereby kills him. Should we say that she acted as she ought to have done, which is what View 2 dictates, or should we deny this, as View 1 dictates?
' See n. 18 for a qualification.
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Michael J. Zimmerman Many would deny it. Moore is a prime example. He would simply apply the distinction between wrongdoing and blameworthiness to this case too, just as he would to Version 2. He would say that, although Jill did wrong in giving John drug C, she is not to blame for doing so.^^ Is this notjust as plausible an assessment of Version 3 as it is of Version 2?
For many years I thought that it was. I no longer think this, for Jackson's own version of his case undermines such an assessment.^T hat version may be put as follows:
Version 4:
All the evidence at Jill's disposal indicates (in keeping with the facts) that giving John drug A will cure him partially and giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable, but (despite the facts) it leaves completely open whether it is giving him drug B or giving him drug C that will cure him completely and whether it is giving him drug B or giving him drug C that will kill him. this is his official position.^^ On the contrary, since conscientiousness precludes deliberately doing what one believes to be overall morally wrong, his giving John drug A would appear to betray the fact that he actually subscribed to something like View 2, the view that he ought to maximize expected value.
That giving John drug A in Version 4 would maximize expected value seems clear. The expected value of an act is a function of the probabilities of its possible outcomes and the actual values associated with these outcomes. Suppose we stipulate that the actual value of providing a complete cure is 50, that of providing a partial cure is 40, that of killing John is -100, and that of rendering John permanently incurable is 0. Let us further stipulate in Version 4 that, in light ofthe evidence available to Jill, the probability that drug A will provide a partial cure is (for simplicity's sake) 1, that the probability that giving him no drug (call this option D) will render him permanently incurable is also 1, and that for each of drugs B and C the probability that it will provide a complete cure is .5 and the probability that it will kill John is also . Clearly, then, giving John drug A would maximize expected value. Of course, there is reason to doubt that such exact assignments of values and probabilities can ever be given, but the beauty and power of Jackson's case is that we apparently need no such exact assignments to be confident that Jill's giving John drug A would fail to maximize actual value yet would maximize expected value. If it is agreed that she ought to give John drug A, then, this would seem to suffice to disprove View 1 while tending to confirm View 2.
There are of course responses that might be made on behalf of View 1. Let me now attend to some.
A
One response is to claim that, despite the appearances to which I have just appealed, the actual values of Jill's alternatives in Version 4 have been miscalculated and her giving John drug A would actually be best after all, despite the fact that it would only lead to a partial cure.
But what reason can be given for this claim? One can of course always 'cook the books' (by fiddling either with the specification of alternatives or with the specification of their values) so that View 1 yields the intuitively correct verdict that Jill ought to give John drug A, but, unless this is done in a principled way, such a victory is merely Pyrrhic. One such principled way would be to assign actual disvalue to the running of risks, regardless of whether these risks are realized. One could then argue that the extra risk associated with Jill's giving John drug B renders her doing so actually worse than her giving him drug A, even though the former would be medically superior. ^T his move is problematic, for two reasons. First, it seems that a Jackson-type case can be constructed that accommodates the (alleged) disvalue of risk.^'' Second, the response impHes that, from the point of view of what counts regarding the determination of Jill's obligation, giving John drug B is vastly preferable to giving him drug C.^^ This seems wrong; since they are equally risky, these alternatives would seem to be on a par with one another from the point of view in question.
B
Another response that might be made on behalf of View 1 is this. Jackson's case (Version 4) indicates precisely why we must distinguish between different 'oughts'. As View 1 implies, Jill oughti (ought objectively) to give John drug B, since this is what would in fact maximize actual value. However, we can also say with perfect consistency that she ought2 (ought subjectively) to give John drug A, since this is what^ Compare David Sosa, 'Consequences of Consequentialism ', Mind 102 (1993) pp. 109-10.
' Recall the actual values recently assigned; a complete cure, 50; a partial cure, 40; death, -100; no cure, 0. Suppose that the (dis)value associated with the risk in giving either drug B or drug C is -15. Then, if we simply add in the value of risk-taking, the actual values of Jill's alternatives would he as follows: A, 40; B, 35; C, -115; D, 0. Even on View 1, then, Jill ought to give John drug A. But now suppose that Jill's evidence is such that it is not death but rather a less serious deterioration in John's health that she risks if she gives John either drug B or drug C. Let the actual value of such a deterioration be -50. Presumably, the actual (dis)value associated with risking such a deterioration will he less than that associated with risking death. Let us stipulate that this value is -8. Then the actual values of Jill's alternatives would be as follows: A, 40; B, 42; C, -58; D, 0. View 1 would then imply that Jill ought to give John drug B after all. But this is highly dubious. Note that the expected values of Jill's altematives (when no actual value is assigned to the taking of risks) would he as follows: A, 40; B, 0; C, 0; D, 0. View 2 would thus imply that Jill still ought to give John drug A. Although the numhers just used, and the method of aggregation, are of course spurious, their being so in no way undermines the general point that they serve to illustrate.
' Compare the values of 35 and -115 assigned to B and C, respectively, in the last note. (b) apply. I concede that View 1 might be accepted if 'ought' is construed differently. But I would once again counsel against using 'ought' in such a way; we can simply say that Jill's giving John drug B would be actually best and leave it at that, avoiding any hint of confusion with the 'ought' of overall moral obligation (the 'ought' with which proponents of View 1 such as Moore have traditionally been concerned).
But, it may be retorted, surely the conscientious person is concerned with the actual values of his alternatives, and so it would be a mistake to say that the 'ought' of overall moral obligation is not to be understood in terms of such values.
This misrepresents my position. Expected value is in part a function of actual value; hence anyone concerned with the former will indeed also be concerned with the latter.^^ If, contrary to my advice, you insist on attaching an 'ought' to what is actually best among an agent's alternatives, we can say that the fact that Jill ought to give John drug A is in part a function of the fact that she ought to do what is actually best and give him drug B. But in saying this we must keep clearly in mind that the latter 'ought' does not express overall moral obligation.
In Version 4, Jill is (let us assume) very much concerned -quite correctly -with the actual values of a complete cure, a partial cure, and death. Despite this, she quite deliberately -and again quite correctlychooses an alternative that she knows is not actually best.^° That is precisely how any clear-headed conscientious agent would act under But, it may again be retorted, consider Gladstone Gander, one of Donald Duck's associates.^^ Gladstone is invariably lucky; acting on his hunches, he always manages to choose that alternative which is actually best, despite being no less ignorant than the common person about the details of the situations in which he finds himself Suppose that Gladstone were to find himself in Jill's situation in Version 4. Acting on his hunch in this case, he would give John drug B. Surely, if someone invariably maximizes actual value, then he always acts as he ought. If so, Gladstone not only would but ought to choose drug B rather than drug A. We who are not so lucky ought to choose drug A, since in choosing B we would run an unreasonable risk of harm to John. But it is implausible to say that the correct moral theory should have radically different implications for lucky and unlucky (that is, normal) agents. Rather, we should recognize that all agents have a fundamental obligation to maximize actual value, as View 1 declares. Moreover, all agents have a derivative obligation to act responsibly with respect to the production of actual value. We act responsibly in this regard when we do not run unreasonable risks with respect to the production of actual value. Gladstone would act responsibly if and only if he chose drug B, but a normal agent such as Jill would act responsibly if and only if she chose drug A. Hence Gladstone's derivative obligation coincides with his fundamental obligation, whereas there is no such coincidence in Jill's case. But Jill's fundamental obligation does coincide with Gladstone's: fundamentally, she ought to give John drug B.
I find the proposed distinction between fundamental and derivative obligation obscure, confounding, and unmotivated. It is obscure in that it is hard to see how one obligation can be 'derived' from another when the two confiict. It is confounding in that it raises once again the question of which 'ought' one ought to act on.^^ It is unmotivated in that there would appear to be no good reason to say that Gladstone has any obligation to give John drug B. His being invariably luckŷ ' Compare Gihhard, Wise Choices, p. 43, n. 7. =' I am indehted to Ingmar Persson for hringing this character to my attention and, more generally, for forcefully pressing the case for View 1.^ Note that, like 'ought', the term 'responsible' is treacherous. In one sense, one acts responsibly just in case one fulfills one's obligations (that is, one avoids wrongdoing). This is the sense at issue here. In another sense, one acts responsibly just in case one acts blamelessly (that is, one avoids blameworthiness). This is not the sense at issue here. Compare the discussion in the last section concerning the distinction hetween wrongdoing and hlameworthiness. It could of course happen that, at some point, Gladstone's unbroken string of lucky successes entitles him to rely on hunches that, up to that point, he was not entitled to rely on. But it is precisely at that point that he is no longer lucky when he manages to do what is actually best, in that his choosing that act which in fact maximizes actual value would no longer constitute running an unreasonable risk.^^ And it is at that point that his obligations would part way with those of normal agents such as Jill.
But does this not give rise to a paradox? Suppose that Gladstone is faced with a series of situations of the sort described in Version 4. Right from the start, he relies on his hunch and chooses drug B. Doing so invariably turns out best. At some point, his string of successes entitles him to rely on his hunch. At that point, I have said, his obligation is indeed to choose drug B, whereas previously his obligation has been to choose drug A. But how can it be that, by consistently making a choice of the sort that he ought not to make, Gladstone manages to make it the case that he ought to make a choice of this very sort? I find no paradox here. It frequently happens that one ought not to make a choice of some sort under one set of circumstances but ought to make a choice of that same sort under another set of circumstances.
(Consider the choice to tell a lie, for example.) As the string of successes unfolds, Gladstone's circumstances change. True, his being faced with a choice between drugs A, B, and C is constant; but there is a dramatic change in his evidence with respect to the efficacy of choosing drug B.
E
In a final effort to defend View 1, one might propose the following. Suppose that Jill later comes into possession of new evidence that strongly indicates that drug B would indeed have cured John completely. Even if we understand and condone her having given John drug A, should we not nonetheless say now that she ought instead to have given him drug B? Indeed, is this not what she herself is likely ruefully to admit? If so. View 1 is reinstated.
There are two main ways in which the claim that Jill ought to have given John drug B may be understood: (i) she was obligated to give him drug B; (ii) she is obligated to have given him drug B. The second reading may be dismissed, for obligations cannot be retrospectivê^ He would remain lucky in another sense: he would be fortunate to have hunches whose promptings invariably coincide with the maximization of actual value.
(contrary to what some philosophers maintain^^). The first reading may seem to presuppose View 1, but in fact it does not; accepting the claim on that reading, therefore, does not provide an adequate defense of that view. On the contrary, one could say, in the spirit of View 2, that, by the light of her earlier evidence, in giving John drug A Jill acted as she ought to have done, and also that, by the light of her later evidence, she did not act as she ought to have done. Some authors are willing to countenance both claims. (Jackson is one.^^) Note, however, that this position does not serve to reinstate View 1, since it does not imply that Jill's obligation is ever simply to maximize actual value. On the contrary, it declares Jill's obligation always to be a function not directly ofthe facts, but ofthe evidence available to her, concerning the actual values of her alternatives.
Although the position just outlined is perfectly consistent with the general theme underlying View 2,1 see no reason to embrace it. I think it is a mistake to multiply 'oughts' in the proposed way. Certainly Jill would be justified in sajdng later that it would have been better to give John drug B rather than drug A, but there is no need also to say that she ought to have given John drug B. (That, to paraphrase Bernard Williams, is to provide the agent with one 'ought' too many.)^^ It is the evidence available to an agent at the time that determines what he ought at that time to do.^® Later evidence is irrelevant.^T his dismissal of extra 'oughts' may seem too hasty, though. For the issue just raised occurs not only across times but also across agents. Consider a variation on Version 4 in which Jill's evidence is as stipulated, but Jack's evidence outstrips Jill's and strongly indicates that drug B will cure John completely. And suppose that Jill asks Jack whether she ought to give John drug B. What should Jack say?
If the 'should' in the question just raised expresses overall moral obligation, it could be that View 2 itself would imply that Jack should As confirmation of this, consider the matter from John's perspective. Suppose that Jill had ignored the risk to John, tossed a coin ('Heads, B; tails, C), and the coin had come up heads. Although John would no doubt be relieved to have been completely cured, it would surely be reasonable for him also to be very angry with Jill for having gambled so recklessly with his life. He would think, correctly, that she had seriously wronged him in doing so. expected value for Jack. But the more important question here is whether Jack's telling Jill that she ought to give John drug B would be truthful.
If the evidence available to Jack is also available to Jill, then Version 4 has in fact been misdescribed. But if Version 4 has not been misdescribed, then View 2 implies that Jack's telling Jill that she ought (that is, is overall morally obligated) to give John drug B would not be truthful.''^ This seems to me the correct verdict."*^ Jill ought not to give John drug B but to give him drug A instead. It would of course remain the case that, if Jack were to tell her that she would do best to give John drug B, he would be speaking both truly and justifiably. IV I have argued that both View 1 and View 3 are false. This of course does not imply that View 2 is true. The claim that in Version 4 Jill ought to give John drug A is implied by a number of theses other than the thesis that one ought in general to maximize expected value. Nonetheless, I propose that we now take the further step of assuming that View 2 is superior to all such rival theses and thus that we accept that what a conscientious person would strive to do, and what any person ought to do, is maximize expected value. I want now to refine this claim.
As noted earlier, the expected value of an action is a function of the probabilities of its possible outcomes and the actual values associated with these outcomes. I have already said that I will leave open precisely what sort of value is at stake, but, in redemption of Promissory Note no. 4,1 must now say something to identify the sort of probability at issue.
It is common to distinguish between objective and subjective probability. The sort of probability at issue here is neither of these, as they are typically understood. Rather, as the foregoing remarks indicate, it is an epistemic kind of probability, having to do with the evidence that is available to the agent.*^ (It is the state of Jill's evidence in Version 4
•"' Unless Jack possesses an authority such that his very pronouncements have special evidential weight for Jill. In such a case, his telling Jill that she ought to give John drug B might suffice under the circumstances to make it the case that she ought.
"' On p. 184 of Rights, Restitution, and Risk (Camhridge, Mass., 1986) , Judith Jarvis Thomson wavers on this point, although that may in part be because she construes 'ought' differently.
''^ If causal determinism is false, certain events are such that there is an 'objective probability' less than 1 but greater than 0 that they will occur; facts of this sort may not square with the agent's evidence and may thus be irrelevant to the present discussion. 'Subjective probability', on the contrary, is typically understood in terms ofthe probability (of some sort) that someone ascribes, either explicitly or implicitly, to an outcome; ascriptions of this sort may also not square with the agent's evidence and may thus once again be irrelevant to the present discussion. that dictates that she ought to give John drug A.) We must make sure to distinguish between evidence that is available to someone and evidence of which that person in fact avails himself. Available evidence is evidence of which someone can and ought, in some sense, to avail himself. Whatever exactly this sense of 'ought' is, it is an epistemic one. It is not intended to be understood to express moral obligation; for that would introduce a circularity into View 2, according to which moral obligation is itself a function of expected value and, hence, of available evidence. (Redemption of Promissory Note no. 2: it is for this reason that failure to heed available evidence is not necessarily a moral failing and, thus, is not necessarily indicative of negligence.^^) Assignments of epistemic probability may be understood as follows. If a proposition, p, is certain for someone, S (that is, if S is justified, epistemically, in having full confidence in p), then the probability of p for S is 1. If p is certain for S, then its negation, ~p, is certainly false for S; in this case, the probability of ~p for S is 0. If p and ~p are counterbalanced for S (that is, S is justified in having some confidence in each of p and ~p, but no more confidence in one than in the other), then the probability of each of p and ~p for S is .5.^* If S is justified in having greater confidence in p than in ~p, then the probability of p for S is greater than .5 and the probability of ~p for S is less than .5; in such a case, p may simply be said to be probable for S, and ~p improbable.*( It may frequently be the case that S's situation is such that the probability of p for S cannot even in principle be assigned a precise number between 0 and 1, but for the sake of simplicity I will here assume otherwise.*^) I will use the term 'evidence' to refer to whatever it is that justifies someone's being more or less confident in a proposition. (I will not inquire into the nature of evidence.) The stronger S's total ••^ I do not mean to deny that there is a moral question about what evidence to seek, use, and so on, or that the answer to this question will vary according to what values are at stake. My point is that the notion of available evidence is itself not a moral one but an epistemic one. The '-able' indicates not simply evidence that can be accessed but evidence that is in some sense epistemically worthy of access, so that, if one's beliefs do not comport with one's evidence, one has made an epistemic mistake, whether or not one has made a moral mistake.
" The stipulation that S is justified in having some confidence in each of p and ~p ensures that the equal probabilities ofthese propositions are not derived simply from S's being wholly ignorant about them. Compare D. H. Mellor, Probability (London, 2005), pp. 27-9, on the principle of indifference.
••^ Compare Roderick M. Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edn. (Englewood Cliffs, 1989), ch. 2, for a somewhat similar account. However, Chisholm writes in terms of variations in the degree (or level) of the justification that there may be for a belief, rather than in terms of variations in the degree of belief (or confidence) that may be justified. Also, he does not put the concept of probability to use as I have done.
••^ There is, in addition, the question of how epistemic probability of the sort outlined here relates to the standard probability calculus. Certain of the standard axioms do not apply in the present context. I cannot pursue the issue further here. evidence for p, the greater the confidence S is justified in having in p. (Presumably, in order for S to know p, p must be probable for S, but more than that I will not venture to say -not only because of Gettiertype concerns having to do with defective evidence, but also because of lottery-paradox-type concerns having to do with very high probabilities that seem nonetheless insufficient for knowledge.) It can clearly happen that the evidence available to S regarding p is different from the evidence available to S* regarding p, so that the probability of p for S is different from the probability of p for S*. Just what it is for evidence to be available to someone, however, is a difficult issue that I will also leave to one side."*L et us now return to Version 4. There the verdict was that Jill ought to give John drug A, because doing so would maximize expected valueany other choice would be unacceptably risky. These calculations reflect the (unrealistic) presupposition that the evidence available to Jill is such that it is certain for her that giving John drug A will partially cure him and that giving him no drug will render him permanently incurable, while, for each of drugs B and C, she is justified in having no more confidence in the proposition that giving John the drug will cure him completely than in the proposition that it will kill him. Note that, although the calculations are sensitive to deficiencies in Jill's evidence regarding the possible outcomes of her options, they are not sensitive to deficiencies in her evidence regarding the possible values of these outcomes. It is as if all the relevant values are being treated as being certain for her, even if some of the relevant
•" For a valuable discussion of this elusive notion, see Richard Feldman, 'Having Evidence', Philosophical Analysis, ed. D. F. Austin (Dordrecht, 1988) .
Michael J. Zimmerman outcomes are not. But this could well be false. It could happen, for instance, that all the relevant outcomes are certain while some of the relevant values are not. For example, suppose that Jill has a pill that she can dispense to either John (act E) or to Jane (act F), but not to both. The pill is certain to induce a partial recovery in John but a complete recovery in Jane. The problem is that, although John is a human being, Jane is not -she is a hamster (Jill is both a physician and a vet) -and Jill's evidence concerning the relative values of the lives of humans and hamsters is equivocal. It is certain for her that the value of a partial recovery in John is 100, but her evidence concerning the value of a complete recovery in Jane is divided. She is justified in having some confidence in the proposition that hamsters' lives are considerably less valuable than humans', and thus to set the value of a complete recovery in Jane at 20. But she is justified in having equal confidence in the proposition that such an assignment of value is merely speciesist, and that the value ofa complete recovery in Jane is actually 120. Under the circumstances, what I will call the expectable values of Jane's alternatives may be computed as follows: E*V(E) = (100 X 1) = 100 E*V(F) = [(20 X .5) + (120 x .5)] = 70 (Whereas the expected value, EV, of an act is a function of the probabilities of its possible outcomes and the actual values associated with these outcomes, the expectable value, E*V, of an act is a function ofthe probabilities of its possible outcomes and theprobable values associated with these outcomes.) The general lesson of Version 4 is that an agent's overall moral obligation is a function, not directly ofthe outcomes of his options, but ofthe evidence available to him concerning these outcomes. Such evidence may be empirical (as in Version 4, where the relevant evaluative facts are implicitly taken as certain) or evaluative (as in the present case of John and Jane, where the relevant empirical facts are implicitly taken as certain). In his own discussion of his case, Jackson pays attention only to empirical probabilities and ignores evaluative probabilities. This is unwarrantedly one-sided. We should take both kinds of probabilities into account.*^ If we do so (and if we have already "•^ In his 'Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Ohjection ', Minds, Worlds, and Conditionals, ed. Ian Ravenscroft (Oxford, 2006) , and 'Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty', Metaethics after Moore, ed. Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons (Oxford, forthcoming), Michael Smith notes that there is no good reason to claim that overall moral ohligation is a function of empirical but not of evaluative prohahilities. However, he concludes that neither kind of probability is relevant, rather than that both kinds are. In doing so, he appears not to recognize that the Moore-type move of (correctly) taken the 'further step' mentioned at the outset of this section), then we will arrive at the view that overall moral obligation is a matter of what I have called expectable value.*^ Thus I now propose that, instead of View 2 as stated, we consider moving to the following version ofthe general idea that it represents:
2a. An agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would maximize expectable value.
It seems clear, however, that this cannot be the final move, since the evidence pertaining to the expectable values of one's alternatives could be just as defective as the evidence pertaining to their actual values. Version 4 (in conjunction with the 'further step') shows us that, when one's evidence is such that maximizing actual value conflicts with maximizing expectable value, we should sacrifice the former in favour of the latter. But surely a similar case can be constructed in which one's evidence is such that maximizing expectable value conflicts with maximizing expectable expectable value, in which case we should once again sacrifice the former in favour of the latter.
To Let us assume, unrealistically but for the sake of simplicity, that it is certain for Jill that the value of providing a complete cure is 50, that of providing a partial cure is 40, that of killing John is -100, and that of rendering him permanently incurable is 0. Then the expectable values will match the expected values. That is:
distinguishing between wrongdoing and blameworthiness is not an adequate response to Version 4.^ The usual calculation for expected value goes as follows: for each possible outcome, Oi, of an act. A, multiply its probability, given A, by its (actual) value, and then sum these products. The resulting formula for the expected value of A is this: ^i prob (Oj/A) x V(Oi). The calculation for expectable value introduces a further variable, in that each possible outcome has a number of possible values, Vj, whose probabilities must be accommodated. The resulting formula for the expectable value of A is this: J2i prob (Oj/A) x J2j prob (Oi has Vj) X Vj. (For this formula to be applicable, it must be assumed that, if Vj is infinite, then prob (Oi has Vj) = 0.) Let us further unrealistically assume that not only is it the case that the values of providing a complete cure, and so on, are certain for Jill, but also it is certain for her that they are certain for her. But now let us suppose that the relevant empirical probabilities are not certain for her. For example, I have stipulated (unrealistically) that it is certain for Jill that giving John drug A will partially cure him; that is, that prob(partial cure/A) = 1.
Suppose, however, that it is not the case that And so on. Now, no human agent is such that there can ever be an infinite number of levels of evidence pertaining to expectable value; on the contrary, on any occasion the number of such levels is likely to be very small, because one's being justified in having any degree of confidence in a proposition requires that one grasp that proposition, and propositions involving more than just a few levels of such evidence are likely to be beyond anyone's grasp. Thus for every human agent there will always be a level of evidence, L, such that maximization of expectable value at that level does not on that occasion confiict with maximization of expectable value at any higher level, either because, owing perhaps to the agent's cognitive limitations, there is no such higher level or because, if there is such a level, any such level is one at which what maximizes expectable value at it also maximizes expectable value at level L. Let us call L the agent's 'definitive' level of evidence on that occasion. I then propose that, instead of View 2a, we accept the following (still rough) version ofthe general idea it represents:
2b. An agent ought to perform an act if and only if doing so would maximize expectable value at his definitive level of evidence.^°E ven though still rough. View 2b is unfortunately rather complicated.^Î 'm afraid, though, that that just is the lesson of Jackson's case. Overall moral obligation is not as simple a matter as Moore would have it or as we might wish it to be.
'' If, for some non-human agent in some situation, there is no definitive level of evidence, then that agent has no moral obhgation in that situation.
' Calculation of expectable value at levels greater than 1 is a complex matter, especially since the relevant empirical and evaluative probabilities can vary independently of one another. The fact that evidence rarely if ever yields precise probabilities (see the discussion above of assignments of epistemic probability) simplifies the calculation in one way, since one need not worry about computing exact products and sums. But in another way it makes the calculation more complex, since in principle it involves the difficulty of making fuzzy measurements (by means, perhaps, of appealing to intervals rather than to determinate numbers). V I have all along said that Views 1-3 have been stated roughly; I have said this even when View 2 is put in the terms of View 2b. The reason for my saying this can now be given. To say that an act would uniquely maximize a certain value (whether actual, expected, or expectable) among the range of options that the agent has is to say that it is superior in respect of such value to its alternatives in that range. There are, however, serious problems involved in trying to spell out the relevant sense of 'alternative'.^^ These problems can, I believe, be satisfactorily resolved by adopting what has come to be called a 'possibilist' account of obligation.^^ A more precise statement of what I take to be the correct criterion of overall moral obligation would therefore involve a modification to View 2b that accommodates possibiiism. There is no need (and no room) to undertake such a modification here, however.^Î nstead, let me attend to three objections.
The first is this. I myself objected earlier to View 3 that it had the 'grotesque' implication that Hitler did no wrong (as long as he was doing what he believed to be best). A similar objection may be raised against View 2b. Suppose that one is faced with the choice between causing great pain to some innocent people or refraining from doing so, and suppose that it would actually be best to refrain from doing so, but that for some reason (because one's empirical or evaluative evidence is misleading) it would maximize expectable value (at one's definitive level of evidence) to cause the pain. Is it not 'grotesque' to think that under such circumstances one's overall moral obligation is to cause the pain?
Unsurprisingly, I deny the charge. The fact is, any plausible moral view will have implications that may initially be unpalatable. For example, a proponent of View 1 should recognize, as Moore himself does, the distinction between wrongdoing and blameworthiness. In acknowledging the possibility of excuses, one is acknowledging the possibility of blameless wrongdoing. Hitler committed enormous evil. An application of View 1 will likely yield the conclusion that he therefore did great wrong.^^ But even on View 1 it could be that Hitler was blameless. This perhaps unwelcome possibility should not be dismissed 2 Compare Hector-Neri Castafieda, 'A Problem for Utilitarianism', Analysis 28 (1968); Lars Bergstrom, 'Utilitarianism and Alternative Actions ', Nous 5 (1971) .^ See Zimmerman, Concept, ch. 2. ' "' ' I address the issue in Michael J. Zimmerman, 'The Relevance of Risk to Wrongdoing', The Good, the Right, Life and Death, ed. Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason Raihley, and Michael J. Zimmerman (Aldershot, 2006) .^ Whether it does yield this conclusion depends on just how the view is developed. In an attempt to resolve this issue, let me first draw your attention to the 'opposite' question, namely, 'What ought I to do when I do know what I ought to do?' Everyone will agree that the answer to this question is, 'You ought to do that which (you know) you ought to do'. Notice that the following question is different: 'What ought I to do when I know what will maximize actual value?' Here we cannot assume that everyone will agree what the answer is. We know what answer it is that View 1 implies: 'You ought to do that which (you know) will maximize actual value'. But what answer does View 2b imply?
Return to Version 1, which goes as follows:
I said earlier that there would be little hesitation on anyone's part in saying that, in this version of the case, Jill ought to give John drug B, but I also said that there is nonetheless reason to doubt this verdict. In redemption of Promissory Note no. 1, this reason can now be given. Even if Jill knows that giving John drug B will cure him completely and that giving him drug C will kill him, that by itself does not imply that she ought to give him drug B rather than drug C -not if, for Suppose that Jill's evidence concerning the relevant values is accurate and, moreover, that she is justified in having a high degree of confidence in the proposition that giving John drug B will cure him completely. But suppose that she also has some reason to suspect that giving him drug B will kill him, and thus that she cannot be certain that doing so will cure him completely. Under such circumstances, giving John drug B might be unacceptably risky, so that what Jill ought to do is give him drug A instead. Now consider this question: is it compatible with the circumstances just outlined that Jill knows that giving John drug B will cure him completely? (That is, could the high probability of the proposition suffice under the circumstances for her knowing it, despite the fact that she also has evidence against it?) If the answer to this question is 'Yes', then View 2b does not in general imply, as View 1 does, that the answer to the question 'What ought I to do when I know what will maximize actual value?' is 'You ought to maximize actual value'. I suspect, however, that we should not say that, under the circumstances, Jill knows that giving John drug B will maximize actual value. (I am in no position to insist on this, though, having declined to specify just what the relation is between epistemic justification and knowledge.) If this is right, then the answer that View 2b in general implies to the question 'What ought I to do when I know what will maximize actual value?' would seem to be the same as that implied by View 1: 'You ought to maximize actual value'. This is because, under the circumstances envisaged, maximization of actual value and maximization of expectable value apparently coincide.
Let us now turn to the question that is raised by the puzzle: 'What ought I to do when I do not know what I ought to do?' To begin with, we should distinguish this question from the following: 'What ought I to do when I do not know what would maximize actual value?' Notice that the latter question does not even hint at a multiplicity of 'oughts'. Notice also that, while the answer that View 1 provides CYou ought to do that which would maximize actual value') is not at all helpful, the answer that View 2b provides CYou ought to do that which, at your definitive level of evidence, would maximize expectable value') could be more helpful. It is plausible to contend that it is often (and perhaps always) very difficult (and perhaps impossible) to determine what would maximize I say 'only', but this must not be misconstrued. It could well be that on many occasions attending to the available evidence remains a difficult task. It should not be thought that the criterion of moral obligation that View 2b supplies constitutes a readily applicable decision procedure.^T here is a procedure that it provides ('Peruse the available evidence regarding your alternatives and their possible outcomes; assess the expectable values of these alternatives; then do that which, at your definitive level of evidence, has the highest expectable value'), but how easy it is to apply this procedure is another matter. Indeed, to apply it with precision will surely always be very difficult,^^ but precision is not always necessary in order for one to be confident that one has applied the procedure successfully. (Consider Jackson's own case, that is. Version 4. There it is easy to figure out what would maximize expectable value, even if the relevant probabilities cannot be precisely determined.^^ Hence the case's beauty and power. Still, it must also be admitted that the case is an artificially simple one.)
Suppose that someone has tried and failed to apply the decision procedure provided by View 2b and that the time to act has come. He may say, 'I accept View 2b and have tried to discover what, according to that view, I ought to do under the present circumstances. But I have not managed to figure this out. Now what ought I to do?' Insofar as this question is asked out of conscientiousness, we might construe it as a request for help with achieving a sort of prospective 'damage control'. So understood, the question is asked out of a fear of doing wrong and^ wrong. If he fails also to attend the meeting on the second floor, he compounds this (unconditional) wrongdoing. If he fails also to attend the meeting on the third floor, he compounds it still further; and so on. Notice, however, that the relevant unconditional subsidiary (tbat is, non-primary) obligations are detacbed if but only if tbe relevant conditions are satisfied. If Matt attends tbe meeting on tbe first floor, be does no unconditional wrong whatsoever. As it stands. View 2b implicitly concerns only primary unconditional obligation. It can be extended to cover subsidiary obligation. In tbat way levels of 'ougbt' can easily be accommodated, and moreover tbere is no tbreat of a vicious regress; for, like tbe number of floors in Matt's building, tbe number of levels of obligation will be flnite.
It may seem tbat we could apply tbis approacb to the present problem. We migbt say: ifyou do not know wbat your primary obligation is, tben you bave a secondary obligation to do sucb-and-sucb; ifyou do not know either what your primary obligation is or what your secondary obligation is, then you have a tertiary obligation to do so-and-so; and so on. But, altbougb View 2b can and sbould indeed be extended to accommodate subsidiary obligation, doing so will unfortunately not help us solve the present problem. This is because ignorance of one's obligation, at wbatever level, does not generate some furtber subsidiary obligation. Consider Matt. His primary obligation is to attend the meeting on the first fioor; doing so is, we may say, 'deontically supreme', in that it is superior (from the point of view of what determines obligation) to any of his other options. To say that he has a secondary obligation to attend tbe meeting on tbe second floor, if be fails to attend the meeting on the first floor, is to say that, if the option of attending the meeting on the first floor is abstracted from his range of options and thus discounted, then the option of attending the meeting on the second floor becomes deontically supreme. In order for tbis conditional obligation to trigger a corresponding unconditional obligation, it must be tbe case tbat tbe option that is abstracted does not occur. But then this approach cannot be applied to our present problem, precisely because ignorance of an action's being obligatory does not entail nonperformance of tbat action. Matt may be ignorant of his obligation to attend the meeting on the first fioor, but that does not trigger an obligation to attend the meeting on the second fioor. Despite his ignorance. Matt might nonetheless attend the meeting on the first fioor. If he does, then he does no wrong whatsoever. It is therefore not in general the case that, ifyou do not know what your primary obligation is, then you have a secondary obligation to do sometbing else.^'^'^ More generally still, it is not the case that On(p) & ~K[On(p)] t-On+i(~p). Again, the reason is that, even ifyou do not know that you oughtn so to act that p (i.e. ~K[On(p)l), this Tbougb initially tempting, invoking subsidiary obligation in tbe effort to resolve tbe puzzle posed in Section I tbus strikes me as futile. And I can find no better way to bandle tbe request for 'damage control'. I am afraid that, if someone has tried and failed to discover what act View 2b requires of bim, and 'cruncb time' has come and he asks you what he ought now to do, then if you also do not know what would, at his definitive level of evidence, maximize expectable value for bim, all you can say is tbis: Tou ougbt to do that which, at your definitive level of evidence, would maximize expectable value, wbatever tbat may bappen to be'. Tbere is no otber 'ougbt' to invoke, and at least you will bave spoken trutbfully, if not belpfuUy.
Or ratber: there is no other 'ought' that expresses overall moral obligation to invoke. You can of course always resort to the familiar answer 'You ought to do whatever you think you ought to do' (or perhaps the somewhat less familiar answer Tou ought to do whatever you think gives you the best chance of doing what you ought to do'), but in general this will be true only if tbe first 'ougbt' does not express overall moral obligation (given tbat the second 'ought' does).^^ The answer can then be understood as equivalent to Tou will avoid blamewortbiness if you do wbatever you tbink you ougbt to do (or, perbaps, ifyou do wbatever you tbink gives you the best cbance of doing wbat you ougbt to do)', in wbich case, as noted in Section II, I think it can be accepted (witb qualifications^*). But, even if acceptable, this answer will unfortunately be of little belp. Even if tbe person asking the question does already believe, of some act A, tbat he is obligated to do A (or tbat doing A will give bim tbe best cbance of fulfilling bis obligation) -wbicb he may well not, since he is seeking your advice on the matter -telling him is consistent with your nonetheless so acting that p and thus with your doing what you oughtn to do; and ifyou do do what you oughtn to do, then no unconditional obligationn+i to act otherwise will arise.
Here is an alternative route to the same conclusion. The following principle is plausible: On(p)&On+i(~p/q)] I-On(~q). (For an account of moral obligation that sanctions this principle, see Zimmerman, Concept, ch. 4.) Now suppose, for purposes of reductio ad absurdum, that (1) you oughti so to act that p and that (2) you ought2 so to act that ~p, given that you do not know that you oughti so to act that p. In light ofthe principle just mentioned, it would follow that (3) you oughti so to act that you know that you oughti so to act that p. But surely (3) is, as a general rule, false: we do not in general have an obligation to know what our obligations are; that is, we are sometimes justifiably ignorant ofour obligations. Thus, if (1) is true, (2) is false; and if (2) is false, no secondary obligation so to act that ~p will arise from your ignorance that you oughti so to act that p.^ The 'oughts' could both express overall moral obligation and your answer could still be true, since it can of course happen that a person is both obligated to do A and believes that he is obligated to do A. But your speaking truthfully would then be sheer happenstance, since ex hypothesi both you and he are ignorant of the fact that his belief about what he ought to do is accurate. " See n. 18 above.
tbat be will avoid blameworthiness if he acts on this belief may provide bim witb some sort of consolation, but it simply does not address bis concern witb avoiding wrongdoing. Here, tben, is bow I would respond to tbe puzzle posed in Section I. Tbe question 'Wbat ought I to do when I do not know wbat I ought to do?' is indeed perfectly cogent, but its cogency does not entail a multiplicity of'ougbts' and we should resist any suggestion that there is such a multiplicity (barring tbe 'ougbts' of subsidiary obligation -but they are not pertinent here).^^ The best answer that we can give to it, helpful or not, is simply this: Tou ought to do whatever it is that would, at your definitive level of evidence, maximize expectable value'. If tbe person wbo asks tbe question believes tbat tbere is a better answer, he is deluding himself. C This response to the puzzle is perhaps more a dissolution than a solution of it and may for tbat reason be disappointing.^^ It may provoke the following third and final objection: 'If tbe unbelpfulness of tbe response "You ought to do that which, at your definitive level of evidence, would maximize expectable value" (made to someone who has not been able to figure out what would maximize such value) is not sufficient reason to reject View 2b, tben the unhelpfulness of the response 'Tou ought to do that which would maximize actual value" (made to someone who has not been able to figure out wbat would maximize sucb value) is not sufficient reason to reject View 1. But in tbat case there is no need to move from View 1 to View 2b in the first place'. This, however, misrepresents tbe reason for moving from View 1 to View 2b. That reason was not to find a helpful response to the question 'What ought I to do when I do not know what would maximize actual value?'^R atber, tbe move was dictated by tbe recognition that Jackson's case (Version 4) shows quite clearly that it is not in general the case that one ought, in the sense that expresses overall moral obligation, tô^ maximize actual value. If tbe response Tou ougbt to do tbat wbicb, at your definitive level of evidence, would maximize expectable value' is helpful to someone who has not been able to discover wbat would maximize actual value, tbat is simply a bonus, and not tbe purpose, of tbe move from View 1 to View 2b. Tbat tbe latter view does not itself furnisb a belpful response to tbe furtber question 'Wbat ougbt I to do wben I do not know wbat would maximize expectable value at my definitive level of evidence?' gives no reason to reject it in turn. VI Wbat, finally, sbould be said, in tbe ligbt of View 2b, in response to tbe question 'Is moral obligation objective or subjective?' Tbe answer of course depends on wbat 'objective' and 'subjective' are taken to mean. In one common sense, obligation may be said to be objective if it is possible for someone to be mistaken about wbat be ougbt to do, and subjective otberwise. On tbis understanding. View 2b implies tbat obligation is objective. (As is not tbe case witb View 3, even if one knew tbat View 2b was true, one could easily fail to know wbat one ougbt to do.) Tbis seems to me exactly what we should say. Conscientiousness presupposes that obligation is objective, in this sense. If obligation were not objective, conscientiousness would thus be fundamentally delusional, which it surely is not.
In another common sense, obligation may be said to be objective if it is not even in part a function ofthe agent's mental state, and subjective otherwise. On this understanding. View 2b implies that obligation is subjective. (Note tbat, even tbougb View 2b implies tbat wbat one ougbt to do is in part a function of wbat one is justified in believing ratber than of wbat one does believe, still what one is justified in believing is a function of wbat one does grasp or understand.) Lest tbis be tbougbt objectionable, it is worth pointing out that even adherents of View 1 are likely to take obligation to be subjective, in tbe present sense. (Whether this is in fact so will depend on how exactly they develop their view.) Moore himself, for example, takes obligation to be restricted to tbose acts that he calls 'voluntary' (in the sense that one would perform them if one chose).^^ Moreover, it seems clear that any plausible view of obligation must take it to be subjective, in tbe present sense. Tbis is because wbether one is a moral agent (in the sense of being capable of baving moral obligations) is surely in part a function of one's mental capacities. Normal adults are moral agents, wbereas infants and nonhuman animals are not, and this has at least in part to do with the difference in their mental capacities.
